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America’s Role in the World
Jason Edwards
 As the United States transitions to the new Obama 
administration, American foreign policy has a serious 
debate that is occurring, albeit subtly, among pundits, 
politicians and policymakers: what should the role of 
the United States be within the world? In fact, this 
question has been a bone of contention through the 
history of American foreign policy, particularly during 
times of transition such as the end of the Spanish-
American War, World War I and II. Today, we are also in 
a period of transition. America’s image has been badly 
damaged by military missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and many write that the United States is on the decline 
and that it will eventually lose its might, as has every 
major power has since the beginning of recorded his-
tory. What America’s role should be is the fundamental 
question that animates my current research and the 
subject of this account. In the following paragraphs,  
I provide a synopsis of that debate, how President 
Clinton dealt with this subject, and where it might  
go from here. 
During the 1990s, I became fascinated by how the 
United States would enact its role as world leader with-
out a Soviet enemy. I was particularly interested in how 
President Clinton managed this new era. I became inter-
ested in Clinton because he was a key transition figure 
as the United States moved from the Cold War to an age 
of globalization and because of the level of foreign poli-
cy activity that occurred during his administration. Yet 
Clinton would not be able to rely on the rhetorical 
conventions of the previous era. As a result, I asked how 
would Clinton rhetorically guide the United States 
without the luxury of the Cold War? Would the U.S. 
become more internationalist or retrench and become 
isolationist? When, where, and why would the United 
States use force? What would replace containment as 
America’s grand strategy? These questions and others 
led me to write my recently released book: Navigating 
the Post cold War World: President clinton’s Foreign Policy 
Rhetoric. In Navigating, I argue that Clinton was able to 
provide a vision for U.S. foreign policy by modifying 
and adapting America’s foreign policy vocabulary—a set 
of underlying beliefs, assumptions, ideals, and conven-
tions that all presidents draw upon in their foreign 
policy rhetoric. What makes each president unique are 
the specific modifications and contributions made to 
this lexis. These alterations tell us as much about the 
president as they do about the circumstances he faced in 
making foreign policy. The modifications made by a 
president create a rhetorical signature for his presidency 
and a symbolic legacy in foreign relations that influ-
ences future administrations. Navigating the Post-cold 
War World is my analysis of the rhetorical signature that 
Clinton created, how he used his discourse to shape and 
manage this new era of globalization, and the symbolic 
legacy he left for future administrations.
One specific area of analysis was America’s role in the 
world. I dedicate an entire chapter to outlining the 
various rhetorical strategies that Clinton used to main-
tain and extend America’s role as world leader. What is 
central to this article and the focus of my current re-
search project is what influences the debate over the 
U.S. role in foreign relations. In writing Navigating, I 
found that this debate is premised by various strands of 
American exceptionalism. 
American exceptionalism is the distinct belief that the 
United States is a unique, if not superior, nation that 
has a special role to play in human history. In his fa-
mous treatise, democracy in america, Alexis de 
Tocqueville was the first person to reference America as 
exceptional, but our exceptionalist roots can be traced 
much earlier to the colonial period. Puritan leader John 
Winthrop proclaimed that the Massachusetts Bay colo-
ny was going to be a “new Israel” that would be a “shin-
ing city upon a hill” for the world to emulate. Later, 
Thomas Paine, writing in common Sense, pronounced 
that the American colonies had the “power to begin the 
world over again.” This power led many to believe that 
through America’s providential nature, it could escape 
the trappings of monarchy, a hereditary elite, and other 
ills that plagued Europe in the late eighteenth century. 
Eventually, this exceptionalist belief became engrained 
in American political culture. Today, most public figures 
find no fault with the idea that the U.S. is not only a 
unique nation, but larger superior to other states around 
the world. 
Generally, three basic tenets make up Americans’ belief 
that theirs is a chosen nation. First, the United States is 





























United States is qualitatively dif-
ferent than other nations. Third, 
exceptionalists believe that the 
United States can escape the prob-
lems that eventually plague all 
states. Taken together, these excep-
tionalist tenets function to give 
Americans order to their vision of 
the world and their place within it. 
American exceptionalism largely 
defines how the United States sees 
itself within the international 
order. However, what the United 
States’ specific role should be, how 
it is enacted, and what activities 
can be sanctioned to fulfill these exceptional qualities 
has been a matter of debate for decades. Two distinct 
traditions of how the U.S. fulfills its special destiny have 
been projected by American politicians. These two 
traditions are known as the mission of exemplar and the 
mission of intervention. According to exemplarists, 
America’s role in the world is to stand apart from the 
rest of the world and serve as a model of social and 
political responsibility. In order for the United States to 
fulfill its exceptionalism, it should engage in activities 
that make itself a beacon for the world to emulate, such 
as increasing material prosperity, integrating diverse 
communities into one America and working for more 
civil rights. Yet exemplarists argue that being a model 
for the world is a full-time job. Engaging in other activi-
ties, such as intervening in the affairs of other states, 
puts an undue burden on the American people and 
could risk domestic gains that it has made at home. This 
basic credo was largely followed by early American 
political leaders. President George Washington warned 
the young republic in his Farewell Address to stay away 
from “permanent alliances” which may stunt its 
growth. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson 
argued that America’s foreign policy would be to “seek 
peace, commerce, and friendship with all, but entangl-
ing alliances with none.” Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams maintained that the United States does not go 
“abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Rather, it is 
the “well-wisher of freedom and independence to all.”   
These examples yield the idea that this exemplarist 
foreign policy tradition has largely been a constraint 
upon American action, keeping it out of the political 
affairs of states during the nineteenth century. 
On the other side of this debate are proponents of the 
mission of intervention. Interventionists maintain that 
America best demonstrates its exceptionalism by active 
engagement with the world on economic, political, 
social and cultural terms. These advocates claim that 
the U.S. cannot stay out of the affairs of other nations 
and organizations. The world is too integrated, too 
interconnected. Rather, America, because 
of its providential heritage, has a duty 
and a responsibility to lead the world 
toward more democracy, more freedom, 
and more liberty, while defending those 
who subscribe or attempt to subscribe to 
similar ideals. Largely, the proponents of 
this mission have been twentieth-century 
politicians. In the debate over the fate of 
the Philippines, President William 
McKinley argued that America’s purpose 
was to “civilize” the population and 
“rescue” them from their “savage” nature. 
On the eve of the U.S. entering World 
War I, President Wilson argued that the 
United States must intervene to make the “world safe 
for democracy.”  During his Truman Doctrine address, 
President Truman stated that the “free peoples of the 
world look to the United States to help maintain their 
freedoms.”  In his inaugural address, President Kennedy 
promised that the United States “would bear any bur-
den” and “oppose any foe to assure the success of lib-
erty.”  Ultimately, these examples demonstrate that 
American politicians have come to argue that it is 
America’s responsibility, as the “leader of the free 
world,” to actively defend and promote the spread of 
democracy for its own interests and for the internation-
al community. America’s exceptional heritage is fulfilled 
by engaging in this interventionist mission.
Over the past one hundred years, exemplarists and 
interventionists have often been at odds with each 
other. Each camp has a distinct vision of what the 
United States should do to best influence the affairs of 
the world. At times in American history, these visions 
come into direct conflict. Some of these examples in-
clude the imperialism debate during the Spanish 
American War in the late nineteenth century, the debate 
over America’s inclusion in the League of Nations at the 
end of World War I, and the debate over whether the 
United States should actively be in the conflict during 
World War II. With the end of the Cold War, the debate 
over America’s role in the world exploded again. 
Exemplarists launched an active media campaign that it 
was time for the United States to retrench. For example, 
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, a staunch cold warrior, advocated that 
since the United States won the Cold War that it should 
return to its “normal” foreign policy of nineteenth cen-
tury exemplarism. During the 1992 presidential cam-
paign, Republican candidate Patrick Buchanan advocat-
ed that the United States should discontinue foreign 
aid, withdraw troops from South Korea and Europe, 
defund all international organizations, and return to its 
former policy of no entangling alliances. During that 
campaign, Buchanan’s basic ideal of American retrench-
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ment was shared by Democratic presidential candi-
dates, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder and Iowa 
Senator Tom Harkin. The views of Kirkpatrick, 
Buchanan, Wilder, and Harkin caused, according to 
presidential historian H.W. Brands, a crisis in thinking 
about America’s place in the world.
Amidst this post-Cold War crisis, President Clinton 
articulated his position of what America’s role would 
be. What was unique about Clinton, as I argue in 
Navigating, was that he bridged these diametrically 
opposed camps by fusing the exemplarist and interven-
tionist narratives together. The president’s argument 
went something like this: the United States must main-
tain its interventionist leadership role, but he predicated 
that leadership upon the renewal of its domestic exam-
ple. By fusing the two narratives together he removed 
the inherent tension between the two camps and pro-
vided a logic for the United States to fulfill its exception-
alist destiny by being strong at home so that it could 
maintain its global role as world leader.
In fusing these narratives together, President Clinton 
made specific arguments about fulfilling each mission. 
For Clinton, fulfilling the mission of exemplar required 
the United States do three things. First, the president 
asserted the United States must change the way it 
thinks about the international environment. Clinton 
was one of the first political leaders to recognize, get  
out in front, and talk about the dramatic changes that 
globalization brought to the lives of people around  
the world. For Clinton, globalization was an inevitable 
reality. No country could escape it. The massive changes 
created both opportunities and challenges. The United 
States could make globalization its friend or its foe,  
but if America wanted to win it had to realize that it 
must adapt, manage, and direct this new era toward 
American interests. According to Clinton’s logic,  
modifications to this era began with the United States  
re-establishing itself as an example for the rest of  
the world.
For Clinton, restoring America’s exemplar heritage 
began with rebuilding its domestic economy. When 
Clinton entered office, the U.S. was just beginning to 
recover from the early 1990s recession. However, the 
president asserted throughout the 1992 presidential 
campaign and in the early days of his presidency that 
America’s prior generation of political leaders (primarily 
Republican presidents) had done little to equip the 
United States to deal with the new realities of the global 
economy. America had not set out on an aggressive 
campaign of retooling industries to meet global de-
mand, it had not expanded its trade agreements with 
other countries, and it had not reeducated its popula-
tion to learn new skills that could be used in an era of 
globalization. As a result, the United States was behind 
other nations and it was no longer the most dynamic, 
creative economy in the world. To remedy this situa-
tion, the president asserted that the U.S. must get its 
economic house in order. It must reeducate its popula-
tion, it must expand its trade agreements, and it must 
retool the economy for 
more exports; all of which 
the administration accom-
plished in its eight year 
foreign policy stint. 
Evidence of these accom-
plishments were constant-
ly touted by Clinton: the 
negotiation of over 300 
bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements, the 
creation of 22 million jobs, 
the expansion of American 
exports, the general rise of 
American wages, and the 
growth in direct foreign 
investment, along with 
other economic accom-
plishments, were proof that the United States’s status 
as an exemplar nation was redeemed. In turn, this  
evidence positioned to maintain its station of global 
leadership.
Additionally, President Clinton maintained the United 
States must improve the overall American community 
to reaffirm its exemplar status. One of the things that 
the president consistently highlighted was America’s 
diversity, a diversity in which hundreds of different 
groups—racial, ethnic, linguistic, and socioeconomic—
live in relative harmony. The ability of diverse popula-
tions to live in peace acted as grounds to warrant con-
tinued U.S. leadership. The United States acted as a 
model for other nations with diversity problems. That 
said, Clinton argued there was room for improvement. 
The president made racial reconciliation, with his sec-
ond-term initiative of “One America,” the centerpiece of 
his domestic agenda. He wanted Americans to converse 
on the subject of race and how it impeded their progress 
toward a “more perfect union.” Although, the president 
did not succeed with many of his One America initia-
tives, he moved the debate on race further than had any 
president for thirty years. Clinton’s attempt to deepen 
our appreciation for diversity positioned the United 
States as a leader in a multicultural world, renewed its 
exemplarist role.
While Clinton’s discourse in the context of the exem-
plar mission provided rhetorical grounds to continue 
U.S. global leadership, he also stated that we would not 





























an age of globalism, America was the “indispensable 
nation” to provide leadership in shaping, managing and 
directing this new era. In fulfilling the mission of inter-
vention, the president spent most of his time making 
the case why the U.S. should continue its station as the 
“indispensable nation.” The case for leadership was 
contained in two overarching and overlapping claims. 
The first involved our role as world leader and the legacy 
of transitional leadership that American generations 
had shown in the past. In particular, Clinton constantly 
compared and analogized the U.S. position in the 1990s 
with that of America in the 1940s. According to the 
president’s logic, the United States did not shrink from 
its leadership role in the great transition from World 
War II and under his leadership it would not shrink 
from leading the world in transitioning to an age of 
globalization. By maintaining and expanding its leader-
ship role, the United States continued the legacy of 
leadership left by America’s “greatest generation.”  In 
doing so, the “globalization generation”—and by exten-
sion Clinton—became models for future generations to 
emulate. By continuing the intervention mission the 
“globalization generation” had the potential to be as 
important as the “greatest generation.”
The second claim Clinton made was that U.S. leader-
ship was needed to mold and direct this era toward its 
interests. Embedded within this argument was a sense 
of urgency and immediateness. For example, Clinton 
told a national audience in his 1993 Address to Congress 
that “if we do not act, the moment will pass and we will 
lose the best possibilities of our future. We face no im-
minent threat, be we do have an enemy. The enemy of 
our time is inaction.” The exigency of Clinton’s presi-
dency demanded American leadership because without 
it the “moment will pass.” Here, the president implied 
that the United States would not be beaten by an exter-
nal threat, but by an internal one: our own inaction and 
inability to evolve. By not leading, America could not 
progress. If it could not progress, then it could not fulfill 
its destiny to influence the affairs of the world. For 
Clinton, then, it became imperative for the United 
States to maintain, if not expand, its leadership station 
to remain the “indispensable nation.” If not, then  the 
country’s exceptional nature was in danger.Maintain-
ing the interventionist mission was imperative for the 
Clinton administration.
Since President Clinton left office a number of happen-
ings have damaged America’s position as world leader. 
Military missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan, abuse at Abu 
Ghraib, detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the USA Patriot 
Act, wiretapping of American citizens and other prob-
lems have only fed the fire against America’s exception-
alist interventionism and its exceptionalism in general. 
Ever since President Bush decided to enter Iraq in March 
of 2003, left-leaning foreign policy critics, such as Noam 
Chomsky and Chalmers Johnson, have argued that the 
United States is pursuing a drastic militaristic form of 
interventionism that has it dangerously close to becom-
ing an empire. On top of that, there are a growing num-
ber of conservatives who excoriate this militaristic 
exceptionalism. Texas Representative Ron Paul, a 2008 
candidate for president, advocates the United States 
abandon its role as an interventionist state and return 
to a “normal” foreign policy. Johns Hopkins University 
Professor, Francis Fukuyama, a prominent neo-conser-
vative, one-time proponent of the Iraq War and devoted 
interventionist, asserts that the United States must 
return to using unobtrusive strategies such as free trade 
and commerce, a là Washington and Jefferson, to resus-
citate its image and its leadership role. Boston 
University Professor Andrew Bacevich has long been a 
critic of our current U.S. interventionist role. In his new 
book, the Limits of american Exceptionalism, Bacevich 
maintains that our current international position is not 
sustainable. The missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
billions of dollars in trade deficits, and the constant 
promotion of Western-style democracy, has created a 
crisis in American life that may do irrevocable damage 
to its prestige and the power of its example. These 
criticisms point to a much larger foreign policy conver-
sation that rages among America’s foreign policy 
intelligentsia.
It is here where I situate my current research interests. 
My current research project is to trace and analyze 
various enactments of this current debate. For example, 
in his inaugural address, President Obama committed 
the United States to maintaining and resuscitating its 
leadership position. He proclaimed that America is 
ready and has a responsibility to lead. At the same time, 
he indicated he wanted to usher in a new era of engage-
ment with various regions of the globe, such as the 
Muslim world, based on mutual interests and mutual 
respect. How does this “new era” differ from previous 
administrations, such as Clinton? What adaptations 
will President Obama’s administration make in the 
current rhetoric regarding our role in the world, our 
exceptionalist heritage and America’s foreign policy 
vocabulary? What are the limits of America’s station in 
international affairs? How will others, such as Ron 
Paul, challenge these exceptionalist positions? At the 
moment, I don’t have answers to these questions. 
Ultimately, however, my book and my current research 
project aim to help others understand the roots of our 
current foreign policy debates, where they have taken 
us in the past, and where they will take us in the future. 
Understanding these positions and debates are absolute-
ly essential for the health of U.S. foreign policy and 
American democracy. 
—Jason Edwards is assistant Professor of 
communication Studies. 
